What Did the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Do

The SPLM announced that it would join the government on 13 December 2007 following an agreement. The agreement stipulates that the seat of government will rotate every three months between Juba and Khartoum, although it appears that this will be largely symbolic, as will funding for a census (which is crucial for the referendum) and a timetable for the withdrawal of troops across the border. [3] A united opposition will also have to abandon the goal of overthrowing the government by force. This is not a wise or even practical goal. Transformation by armed power has also proven catastrophic in many countries, often leading to chaos or a new autocracy rather than democracy. Much better, it is negotiated. However, abandoning the goal of armed overthrow is the most difficult for armed groups frustrated by false peace proposals or broken political promises. But here too, there are precedents for compromise. Nelson Mandela paid attention both to his electorate, which felt strongly the armed struggle, and to the prospects for successful negotiations when he faced the demands of De Klerk`s government to abandon the ”armed struggle” as a condition for negotiations.

His response was to ”suspend” the armed struggle as long as credible negotiations for democracy were underway. De Klerk was smart enough to accept this compromise. After a while, when the negotiations proved fruitful, the armed struggle became irrelevant. This will be more difficult to achieve in Sudan, but that is where the negotiations should go. UNMIS faced challenges related to peacekeeping and the holding of referendums. Although UNMIS fulfilled its mandate with regard to the referendum, it failed to protect civilians from violence. There is no further information on the effectiveness of the Joint Media Committee in promoting understanding of the peace processes in sudan. It should be noted, however, that the press freedom situation has not improved, as Human Rights Watch`s annual reports suggest.3 I greatly appreciate the honor of speaking today at the Peace Research Institute of the University of Khartoum. The American Institute for Peace, with which I am associated, is dedicated, like the PRI, to ending violent conflict and promoting peace. I think we all agree that these goals are often out of our reach.

In Sudan and South Sudan, despite years of intensive negotiations, several agreements and the dedicated work of so many people, peace remains not only elusive, but in South Sudan and parts of Sudan it has been completely lost. But we cannot despair or withdraw from this work. Too many people are suffering, too much potential is lost, too great is the danger of an even greater loss of life that we have to intensify our work, if at all. I therefore welcome the opportunity for our two institutes to be in close contact to see how we can intensify our efforts in the pursuit of peace. The Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed by the Heads of State and Government of both parties on 9 January 2005. The deadline for approval of the APC was 24 January 2005 for the SPLM National Liberation Council. The peace agreement was signed on 24 September. It was approved by the SPLM National Liberation Council in January 2005. The agreement was unanimously ratified by the SPLM`s National Liberation Council, chaired by SPLM leader John Garang.1 The National Assembly was required to approve the PCA by January 29 and it was approved.2 As such, the mechanism for ratifying the agreement was implemented. Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Presidency is urgently launching a peace and reconciliation process for Abyei, which is committed to harmony and peaceful coexistence in the region. Let me summarize. Sudan is sort of like South Africa in the 1980s.

For a time, he can maintain the historical policy of the traditional rulers of the central part of the country; to pit opposing elements against each other or to repress them militarily; it cannot defeat the insurgents in the Nuba Mountains, but it can contain them; it can live with the quasi-anarchy of Darfur as long as it does not threaten the centre; And it can live economically on a combination of rents, humanitarian aid and a foreign investment net to support the livelihoods of its supporters. Maybe he can do it for a while. But it can only do so at a high cost in the long run. The country will not develop its economic potential, it will not attract significant foreign investment, it will not overcome international shame for its human rights violations, it will not experience peace or real prosperity. At some point, the system will no longer hold. 22.1.10. Collect data and information on criminal cases that threaten the implementation of the peace agreement in the region. The training workshops were organized and designed to develop youth programmes as part of a ”Sport for Peace” initiative, and organized in South Sudan were a very effective means in the reconciliation process. Other mechanisms and attempts by the Government of National Unity to facilitate the reconciliation process remained unclear. With regard to reconciliation and peace in Abyei, the stalemate in the implementation of the Border Commission report continued in 2006.1 There was evidence that Sudan had purchased arms from various mechanisms after the peace process had been launched. It has been documented that between 2003 and 2008, Sudan acquired important weapons systems as well as small arms from countries such as Russia, Belarus, China, Egypt, Iran and even From European Union countries such as France, Italy and Germany.

[fn] Mike Lewis, ”Skirting the Law: Sudan`s Post-CPA Arms Flows,” Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 18 (2009), accessed May 21, 2011, pp. 23-25, www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SWP-18-Sudan-Post-CPA-Arms. However, SPLM/A or UNMIS have not filed a complaint in this regard. China exported arms and imported Sudanese oil.1 As a result, the provision of the agreement relating to the armed embargo was never enforced. And there was no shortage of agreements. Not only the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement itself, but also several agreements on debt, oil, citizenship, assets, the establishment of a demilitarized border, the introduction of new peacekeeping agreements and the joint management of Abyei and others. Some of them were retained; others fell into the water. But the agreements, there were a lot of them. 14.6.5.16.

be responsible for the conduct of peace support operations in co-operations with the VMT, JMC and CPMT until the deployment of UN observers; After that, the roles of the latter cease to exist; Ten years ago today, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ended Sudan`s twenty-one-year civil war. The internationally negotiated agreement between the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in the north and the southern rebel forces of the Sudan People`s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A, later SPLM) was hailed as a huge achievement at the time. .

En reaktion på ”What Did the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Do

  1. Pingback: 3ventricle

Kommentarer inaktiverade.